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'·-~--~· Case No. 7281 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DeLUXE GLASS COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaitntiff ood Responaent 
vs. 
GEORGE \r. MARTIN, doing business as 
Commercial Building Company, CAP-· 
· SON-BOWMAN, INC., a corporation, 
Defenda!nts and Respondents 
: .-"' ~ 
GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF ! T I 
AMERICA, a corporation, Jt.. 1 1 · f.t-, n 
Defendant and Ap,pellJarnt ~ .i_: f . _, · n 
A. BERNSTEIN; ANDE~ON LUMBER 1 ;:j _: 5 Tg.-" · .. 
COMPANY, a corporation; J. HENRrY___ __ .·.:J 
CHAPMAN and GEORGE A. CHAll'!.fh' , su~R-----------~-
MAN, co-partners, doing business as '' f•\1£ CCJURr, uTi;-~ 
CHAPMAN PLUMBING AND HEAT-
ING COMPANY; MILL CREEK L·UM-
BER AND TRANSIT MIX COMPANY, 
a corporation; MORRIS~ON-MERRILL 
C 0 M PAN Y, a corporation; RIo· 
GRANDE LUMBER COMPANY, a 
corporation; R. H. MULHO·LLAND; 
and WILFORD W. GARDNER, . 
Int;erveners I(JJnd Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARTHUR E. MORETON, 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN, 
At·~orneys for Defendant and App·ellant 
Gene11al Caswalty CIOVJ'Y@.!wny of Amerioa, 
a corpora)t'ion. · 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DeLUXE GLASS COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaixntiff and Respond;ent 
vs. 
GEORGE \T. MARTIN, doing business as 
Commercial Building Company, CAP-
SON-BOWMAN, INC., a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents 
GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
AMERICA, a corp·oration, 
Defenaamt and App1ellant 
A. BERNSTEIN; ANDERSO·N L.UMBER 
COMPANY, a corporation; J. HENRY 
CHAPMAN and GEORGE A. CHAP-
~1AN, co-partners, doing business as 
CHAPMAN PL.UMBING AND HEAT-
ING CO·~fPANY; MILL CREEK L·UM-
BER AND TRANSIT MIX CO·MP ANY, 
a corporation; MOR.RIS.ON-MERRILL 
C 0 M P A N Y, a corporation; R I 0 
GRANDE LUMBER COMPANY, a 
corporation; R. H. MULHO·LLAND; 
and WII.1FORD W. GARDNER, 
Int-erveners and Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA~s.E 
Case No. 
7281 
This is an appeal by the defendant General Casualty 
Company of America, from a judgment of the Third 
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District Court, in favor of the plaintiff and the inter-
veners and against defendant Casualty Company, in the 
total sum $6,586.11 ; and from a judgment in favor of 
defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc., against defendant 
Casualty Company in the cross-complaint of the defen-
dant Casualty Company against its co-defendant, Cap-
son-Bowman, Inc. 
·The appellant also appeals from orders of the trial 
court denying its Motion for New Trial, and denying its 
Motion to Amend, Modify, and Add to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law theretofore entered by 
the Court. 
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the plaintiff against 
the defendants in July, 1947, (R. 1). Upon the Stipula-
tion of C.ounsel (R. 19-20) the Court entered an order 
of intervention permitting the various interveners to 
intervene in this ·case, and to file p1leadings setting forth 
their claims. (R. 18-19). 
So far as the issues of this ap·peal are concerned, 
the plaintiff and the various interve:q.ers stand on the 
same footing, and therefore, for -convenience, we shall 
hereafter refer to the plaintiff and interveners 0ollec-
tively as plaintiffs. 
There is no serious dispute as to the facts, though 
there may be some slight dispute as to the inferences 
to be drawn from certain admitted facts. No testimony 
was taken at the trial. The facts are established by the 
al'lega tions and admissions of the various pleadings, and 
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by the Stipulation of facts entered into by Counsel for 
the various parties (R. 348-350, 342-343). 
The -appellant's general Demurrer to the C:omplaint 
filed by the De Luxe Glass Company was sustained (R. 
122) and thereafter amended comp,laints were filed by all 
the plaintiffs (R. 133-164, 189-275A, 299-304). 
The amended complaint of the DeLuxe Glass Com-
pany was in four counts. The material allegations of 
the first count set forth that the defendant Martin was 
a general building construction contractor; that defend-
ant Casualty Company (appellant) is a Washington 
Corporation, regularly doing business in the State of 
Utah; ~that defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc., owned cer-
tain land at 3000 South Highland Driv~e in Sal~t Lake City, 
and that such land was improved by a store building 
erected by defendant Martin pursuant to a certain con-
tract between Martin and Capson-Bowman; that by the 
terms of the -contract Martin was to receive $30,000 
for such construction work, to he paid as follows: 
''On or about the 1st and 15th day of each 
month 90% of the value, based on the contract 
prices, of labor and materia'ls incorporated in the 
work and of materials suitably stored at the site 
thereof to the 1st and 15th day of that month, as 
estimated by the architect, less the aggregate of 
P'revious payments; and upon substantial com-
pletion of the entire work, a sum sufficient to 
increase the total payments to 90% of the con-
tract price. Before above payments are made 
the contractor shall furnish lien waivers for all 
labor and material covered by such payments.'' 
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Attached to and by reference incorporated in the 
Complaint was a copy of the building contract. It was 
further alleged in the compiaint that by the terms of 
the contract the contractor (Martin) should provide 
and pay for all labor and materials; and that if the 
contractor failed to make promp·t payment to sub-con-
tra~tors for material and labor, the owner (Capson-
Bowman) might terminate the employment of the 
contractor. 
The Complaint further alleged the execution and 
delivery to defendant Martin by the defendant Casualty 
Company of the following bond: 
''PERFORMANCE BOND 
(Construction) 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, 
That we, MR. GEORGE V. MARTIN, d.h.a COM-
MER.CIAL BUILDING COMP'ANY, as Principal, 
and G·ENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
AMERICA, as Surety, are held and firmly bound 
unto CAP·SON-BO·WMAN REAL'TY COMPANY 
hereinafter called the Obligee, in the penal sum of 
THIRTY THOUSAND AND N0/100 dollars for 
the payment of v1hich sum well and truly to be 
made we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, ad-
n1inistrators, and successors, jointly and several-
ly, firmly by these presents. 
THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION 
IS SUCH, that whereas the Principal entered into 
a certain con tract, hereto attached, with the 0 b-
ligee, d8Jted Sept·ember 26, 1945, for construction 
of grocery store and drug store complete for fix-
tures, per plans and specifications. Located at 
3000 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, if the Principal shall 
"yell and truly perforn1 and fulfill all the under-
taki:p.gs, covenants, terms, eonditions, and agree-
ments of said contract during the original term of 
said contract and any extensions thereof that n1ay 
be granted by the Obligee, with or without notice 
to the Surety, and during the life of any guaranty 
required under the con tract, and shall also well 
and truly perform and fulfill all the undertakings, 
covenants, terms, conditions and agreements of 
any and all duly authorized modifications of said 
contract that may hereafter he made, notice of 
such modifications to the Surety being hereby 
waived, then, this obligation to be void; otherwise 
to remain in full force and virtue. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-
bounden 'P'arties have executed this instrument 
under their several seals this 26th day of Septem-
ber, 1945, the name and corporate seal .of eaeh 
eorporate p·arty being hereto affixed and these 
presents duly signed by its undersigned represen-
tative, pursuant to authority of its governing 
body. 
In presence of 
R. ,r. Hodgen 
COMMERCIAL BUILDING COMPANY, 
By Geo. V. Martin (Seal) 
(Individual Principal) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(Business Address) 
GENERAL CASUALTY COl\1:P ANY OF 
AMERICA 
(Corporate S:urety 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Business Address)· 
By Ruth Miller Corporate Seal 
(Corporate Seal) Attorney-in-fact" 
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At this time we invite the attention of the Court 
to the fact that Capson-Bowman is the only party named 
as obligee in the bond, and that no reference is made 
to laborers, materialmen or subcontractors, and that 
the bond is not -conditioned for the payment of laborers 
and materialmen. 
The Complaint further aJlleged that Martin ·engaged 
plaintiff to furnish and install all necessary glass in 
the store building, contracted to be ereeted, and that 
plaintiff furnished such glass and Martin agreed to 
pay the reasonable value thereof, to-wit: $1,870.00, and 
that such amount was then due to plaintiff and unpaid. 
. In the second, third, and fourth counts, plaintiff 
sued as assignee of other sub-contractors, laborers, and 
materialmen. Thes~ counts were, insofar as material 
to this case, identical to the first count. Plaintiff p1rayed 
judgment against all defendants (R. 133-158). 
The Amended Complaints filed by the other plain-
tiffs were patterned after that of the DeLuxe Glass 
Company, and so far as material to this controversy 
were identical to it. (R. 189-275 A; 299-304). 
To the various Amended Complaints, the defendant 
interposed general Demurrers (R. 169-170, 187, 27·6-282), 
which Demurrers were by the Court overruled. (R. 290). 
Thereafter, defendant Ca.pson-Bowman filed an 
Answer to the various Amended Complaints, admitting 
practically all of the facts therein alleged, except the 
value of the labor perform·ed and/or material furnished, 
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and non-payment of the same. Capson-Bowman also 
alleged, by way of affirmative defense, payment to the 
Contractor (l\Iartin) of all of the contract :price excep·t 
$2,188.33, which sum it was ready and willing to pay 
upon satisfactory completion of the work; that on in-
formation and belief, plaintiffs were entitled to some 
sum, the amoun·t of which was unknown to Capson-Bow-
man, from defendant Martin, and Capson-Bowman, ther:e-
fore paid the unpaid balance of the eontract p·rice into 
Court; that prior to the commencement of the work by 
Marlin, Capson-Bowman had obtained from him the bond 
refer:ved to in the eomrpilaint, ·cond!tioned upon the farthful 
performance of the contract and executed hy defendant 
Casualty Company; that Cap·son-Bowman exhibited said 
bond upon request of any interested person and that it 
had fully complied with the provisions of 'Title 17, 
Chapter 2, U. C. A. 1943; that it was the intent and pur-
pose of the various parties defendant a.t the time the 
bond was executed to thereby protect laborers and ma-
terialmen, and that any unpaid claims of any of the 
plaintiffs for labor and material should be satisfied by 
the defendant Casualty Company, and Cap.son-Bowman 
should be relieved of all liability ( R. 307-317) . 
Capson-Bowman also filed a cross-complaint against 
its co-defendant Casualty Company, by which it sought 
to place the burden of any judgment which might be 
entered against cross-complainant upon the defendant 
Caualty Company. No facts, not previously stated, were 
alleged in the Cross-Complaint, and therefore, we do 
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not deem it necessary to detail the allegations of that 
pleading ( R. 318-320). 
Defendant Casualty Company filed separate an-
swers to each of the Amended Complaints, admitting 
most of the allegations, and alleging that the bond 
executed hy it was conditioned only for the performance 
and compl·etion of the building eontract between Cap,son-
Bowman and George V. Martin; that defendant Capson-
Bowman failed to comp~ly with the terms of S;ection 
17-2-1, U.C.A., 1943, in failing to obtain a bond condi-
tioned for the ''prompt payment for material furnished 
and 'labor performed, under the contract'' ; that by reason 
thereof defendant Casualty Company was not liable to 
plaintiff for labor and material furnished, hut that de-
fendant Capson-Bowman was liable to said plaintiffs 
for labor and material furnished; that the bond above 
referred to "\vas a performance bond running solely to 
Capson-Bowman and conditioned upon com:pletion of 
the building in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract, and the bond contained no p·rovision for the pay-
ment of laborers and materialmen. (R. 375-377) 
Defendant Casualty Company a:lso filed a Cross-
Complaint against its co-defendant, Cap-son-Bowman, 
alleging many of the facts heretofore stated, and further 
alleging that Capson-B·owman breached that portion of 
its contract with Martin whereby Capson-Bowman 
agreed to withhold payments from the contractor until 
the contractor should furnish lien waivers for all labor 
and materials covered hy such payments; that Capson-
Bowman, without requiring Martin to furnish it with 
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lien waivers, made payments from time to time ''far in 
excess of the amount of such lien waivers ·as were- fur-
nished to it''; that Cap,son-Bowman further violated the 
contract '"'ith Martin by making "p.ayments in excess 
of 90% of the contract price prior to substantial com-
pletion of the entire vvork"; and that such acts were 
prejudicial to the Casualty Company and by reason 
thereof the Casualty Company was released from its 
obligation under the bond. (R. 377 -382). 
By Stipulation of the parties it was agreed that 
there remained due and unpaid to the respective plain-
tiffs for labor and materials under the contract between 
Martin and Capson-Bowman the following amounts for 
labor performed and materials furnished, together with 
interest at 6% per annum from the dates indicated: 
De Luxe Glass Com~pany 
First Cause of Action .. $1,870.00 
Second Cause of Action 1,149.75 
Third Cause of Action__ 933.50 
Fourth Cause of Action 1,710.00 
~fill Creek Lumber and 
Transit Mix Company__ 16.59 
Morrison-Merrill Co.________ 232.90 
Wilford W. Gardner ________ 1;646.39 
Rio Grande Lumber Co.__ ·61.54 
R. H. Mulholland ____________ .____ 98.01 
A. Bernstein________________________ 198.92 
Anderson Lumber Co.______ 78.69 
Chapman Plumbing and 
Dec. 22, 1946 
Mar.11,1947 
Mar.25,1947 
Jan. 6, 1947 
Mar.26,1947 
Feb. 17, 1947 
Jan. 30, 1947 
Oct. 19, 1946 
Jan. 28, 1947 
Oct. 25, 1946 
Nov. 15, 1946 
Heating Co. ___________________ _ 23.36 · S·ept. 6, 1946 
Total ------------------------·----$8,019. 7 6 
( R. 342-343) 
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It was further stipulated between the various de-
fendants that the contract p·rice with additions and 
deductions was $32,406.00. Payments were made by 
Cap·s-on-Bowman as fol1ows: 
Nov. 27, 1945 to Martin ------------------------------$ 411.60 
Mar. 2, 1946 to Martin --------------------·------------ 6,553.23 
May 11, 1946 to Martin ------------------------------ 2, 722.31 
July 8, 1946 to Martin -------------------------------- 2,47 4.50 
Aug. 17, 1946 to Martin ------------------------------ 2,977.00 
Sep. 6, 1946 to .Martin -------------------------------- 2,183.28 
Sep .. 20, 1946 to Martin -------------------------------- 5,245.20 
Oct. 21, 1946 to Martin and 
Seegmiller Elec. Co. ---· -------------------------- 1,100.00 
Oct. 21, 1946 to Martin and 
Hansen N eiderhauser Co. -------------------- 948.86 
Oct. 21, 1946 to Martin and Utah 
Lumber Company ------------------------------------ 119.19 
O·ct. 21, 1946 to Martin and 
L. N. Plant _____ ------------------------ __________ -----·---- 292.20 
Nov. 7, 1946 to Martin and 
F. N. Ellis ------------------------------------------------ 154.71 
Nov. 22, 1946 to Martin . ----------------------------- 3,063.17 
Jan. 17, 1947 to Martin and 
E. C. Kimball ----------------·---------------------------- 150.00 
Jan. 17, 1947 to Martin and 
Pons and Davis ---------------------------------------- 386.70 
Jan. 17, 1947 to Martin and 
Romney Lumber Company -------------------- 390.45 
Sep. 20, 1947 to Clerk of Third 
District Court ______________ ------------------------------ 2,188.31 
To tal ____ --------·-- ___________________________________ .$32,406. 00 
It was further stipulated between :the defendants 
that no liens, or ~laims of liens were filed by any labor-
ers or materialmen; that work commenced on the build-
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ing about September 27, 19±5, and the building was suffi-
ciently completed on November 1, 1946 to be occupied 
in part, and the rest of the building \vas ready for occu-
pancy about January 15, 1947. There were still inoom-
plete items on ~larch 3, 1947, all of which were there-
after completed. (R. 348-350) 
Defendant ~Iartin confessed judgment In open 
Court. (R. 405) 
At the trial the construction contract (Ex. 1), the 
performance hond (Ex. 3) and the cheeks and lien 
waivers (Ex. 5) were received in evidence without ob-
jection. The case was submitted to the Court on the 
pleadings, stipulations of counsel, and the exhibits. No 
testimony was offered. 
On the issues raised by the comp:laints and answers 
thereto, the Court made findings of fact substantially 
in accord with the admitted allegations of the pleadings 
and the stipulations of counsel. The conclusions of Law 
were to the effect that the amount paid into C·ourt by 
Capson-Bowman should be divided among plaintiffs, pro 
rata; that Capson-Bowman, in obtaining the bond of 
Martin as principal and the Casualty Company as surety 
complied with the provisions of Title 17, Chap.ter 2, 
U.C.A., 1943; that :plaintiffs had a right of action against 
defendant Casualty Company on its bond and were en-
titled to r·eeover from the Casualty Company for the 
an1ount owed to them by the contractor; that Cap·son-
Bo\vman was not liable to any of the plaintiffs; that 
~f artin (contractor) was liable to plaintiff for the 
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amounts remaining unpaid to them after application of 
the amount paid into Court by Capson-Bowman and were 
entitled to judgment accordingly, and that defendant 
Casualty Company was liable to the same extent as 
Martin ( R. 355-361). 
On the issues raised by the Casualty Company's 
cross-complaint against Capson-Bowman the Court found 
that ceTtain :payments made by Cap~son-Bowman to the 
contractor were made without retention of the 10% 
prescribed by the contract provisions; that there was 
no evidence that the Casualty Company was prejudiced 
by the failure of Capson-B·owman to comp:ly with the 
retention provisions of the contract, and the Casualty 
Company was not prejudiced or damaged by the failure 
of Capson-Bowman to comply with the terms of the con-
tract; and that defendant Capson-Bowman fully per-
formed its construction contract with Martin. (R. 362-
363). Fr'om the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court 
concluded that the Casualty Company was not entitled 
to any recovery on its Cross-Comp,laint (R. 363). 
The Casualty Company proposed amendm·ents and 
additions to the Findings of Fact and C~onclusions of 
Law to the effect that the bond of the Casualty Company 
was not conditioned for the payment of laborers and 
materialmen and that they had no right of action against 
the Casualty Company; that Capson-Bowman failed to 
comply with Section 17-2~1, U.C.A.., 1943, and therefore, 
CapS'on-Bowman and Martin were sotely liable to the 
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were estopped to claim liability 
on the part of the Casualty Com:pany for the reason 
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that they had the right and duty to exan11ne the bond 
of the Casualty Company, prior to furnishing of labor 
and material and that such examination would have 
disclosed that the bond was not conditioned for the pay-
ment of laborers and materialmen and they were not 
oblig-ees on the b~nd; that defendant Cap·son-B·owman 
was liable to plaintiffs for the full amount remaining 
unpaid; that defendant Casualty Company was damaged 
and prejudiced by reason of the failure· of Ca.pson-Bow-
man to comply with the provisions of its contract with 
Martin in making payments to Martin without requiring 
lien waivers and without retaining the 10% required to 
be retained. (R. 369-371). The Casualty Company's mo-
tion to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as above indicated was denied. (R. 387) 
Judgment was entered decreeing that the sum of 
$2,188.33 paid into Court by Cap·son-Bowman be dis-
tributed ratably among the plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs 
have judgment against the· defendants Martin and the 
Casualty C·ompany in the total sum of $6,586.11; that 
plaintiffs take nothing under their complaint against 
Capson-Bowman; and that the Casualty Company take 
nothing on its cross-complaint against Capson-B·owman. 
( R. 364-366) . 
The Casualty Company's motion for new trial was 
denied. ( R. 387) . 
In detailing the above facts we have attempted to he 
brief without omitting any of the essential facts and 
without clouding the issues. Since the facts are to a 
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large extent without dispute we have taken the liberty 
of summarizing the pJeadings without setting them forth 
in haec verba. Although the factual situation here in-
volv;ed is not particularly ·complicated, the multiplicity 
of parties mal{!es the task of presenting the factual back-
ground somewhat difficult. In the hope that it may be 
of some assistance to the Court we offer the fo'llowing 
summary of the facts as abov~e detailed: 
This is a suit by various subcontractors, laborers, 
and materialm~en, to recover amounts due to them for 
materials furnished and labor performed on a certain 
building owned by defendant, Capson-Bowman, and 
erected by Martin (contractor). The Casualty Company 
is the surety on Martin's Performance Bond. There is 
no question as to the amounts due to the various plain-
tiffs, nor is there any question as to the liability of 
Martin (Contractor) to the plaintiffs. The only issue 
is as to whether the Casualty Company is liable on its 
bond to the plaintiffs, or whether defendant Capson-
Bowman is liable to p:laintiffs under Section 17-2-2, 
U.C.A., 1943, by reason of its failure to procure such 
a hond as is r'equired by the terms of S~ection 17-2-1, 
or whether Capson-Bowman is liable to the Casualty 
Company by reason of i1ts breach of conditions of its 
contract with Martin (Contractor). 
AS;SIGNMEN'TS O·F ERROR 
The appellant assigns as error the following orders 
and rulings of the trial Court: 
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1. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer 
of the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended 
Complaint of plaintiff De Luxe Glass Company. 
2. The Court ,erred in overruiing the Demurrer of 
the Defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Com-
plaint of intervener A. B·ernstein. 
3. The Court erred in -overruling the D~emurrer of 
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Com-
plaint of intervener R. H. Mulholland. 
4. The Court erred in ov~erruling the Demurrer 
of the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended 
Complaint of intervener Rio Grande Lumber Company. 
5. 'The Court erred in overruling th~e Demurrrer of 
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Com-
plaint of intervener Morrison-Merrill Company. 
6. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer of 
the defendant Casualty Comp~any to the Amended Com-
plaint of intervener Wilford W. Gardner. 
7. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer of 
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Com-
plaint of intervener Anderson Lumber Company. 
8. The Court :erred in ov;erruling the Demurrer of 
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amende·d Com-
plaint of intervener Mill Creek Lumber ·and Transit l\{ix 
Company. 
9. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer of 
the defendant Casualty Company to the Cross-Complaint 
of defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc. 
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10. The Count erred in making its Conclusion of 
Law No.2. '(R. 360). 
11. The Court ·erred in making its Conclusion of 
Law No.3. (R. 360). 
12. 'The Court erred in making its Conclusion of 
Law No.4. (R. 360). 
13.. The Court erred in making its Conclusion of 
Law No.6·. (R. 361). 
14. The Court erred in making that portion of 
Finding of Fact N·o. 2 (R. 362) which reads as follows: 
''Other Findings of the Court herein made 
render it unnecessary to find in further detail 
respecting the matter of Compliance by said 
owner, Capson-Bowman, Inc., with said retention 
provisions.'' 
15. The Court erred in failing and refusing to 
make Findings of Fact as to the tim·e, and amo.unt of 
overpayments to defendant George V. Martin by de-
fendant Capson-Bowman, Inc. 
16. The Court erred in failing and refusing to make 
Findings of Fact as to whetheT or not, and if so in what 
amounts, defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc. made pay-
ments to defendant George V. Martin without having 
first obtained lien waivers, in violation of said construc-
tion contract. 
17. The Court eTred in making Finding of Fact No. 
3 ( R. 362-363) . 
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18. The Court erred in making Finding of Fa0t No. 
4 (R. 363). 
19. The Court erred in making Conclusion ·of Law 
No. 1 ( R. 363) . 
20. The Court erred in making Conclusion of Law 
No.2 (R. 363). 
21. The Court in refusing to modify, amend, and 
add to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
proposed by defendant Casualty C~ompany. 
22. The Court erred in entering judgme:rut in favor 
of plaintiff DeLuxe Glass Comp~any and against the 
defendant G~enera1 Casualty· Company of A1nerica. 
23. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor 
of inter¥ener Mill Creek Lmnber and Transit Mix Com-
pany and against defendant General Casualty Company 
of America. 
24. The Court err·ed in entering judgment in favor 
of intervener ].1orrison-J\1:errill C·ompany and against 
defendant Casualty Company. 
25. 'The Court ~erred in .entering judgment in favor 
of intervener Wilford W. Gardner and against defend-
ant Casualty Company. 
26. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor 
of intervener Rio Grande Lumber Comp·any and against 
defendant Casualty Company. 
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27. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor 
of illltervener R. H. Mulholland and against defendant 
C·asualty Company. 
28. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor 
of intervener A. Bernstein and against defendant 
Casualty Comp~any. 
29. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor 
of intervener Anderson Lumber Company and against 
defendant Casualty Company. 
30. The trial Court erred m entering judgment 
agains1t defendant Casualty Company on its Cross-Com-
plaint against defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc. 
31. The trial Court ~erred in denying appellant's 
Motion for a New trial. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
At the outset of this argument w·e desire to make 
crystal clear, and to emphasize to the Court, •tha.t there 
is no issue in this case as to the rights of the plaintiff 
and interveners to he paid the full amount of their claims. 
So much is admitted by all of the defendants. The real 
issue in this case is. as to whether the· surety on the con-
tractor's :performance bond, or the owner of the building 
must foot the bill. ·The issue is a purely legal one, de·-
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pending upon a proper construction of the performance 
bond, and of 'Title 17, Chapter 2, U. C. A., 1943. 'The 
Court need have no reticence to reverse the trial Court 
for fear that the rights of the p'laintiffs will be thereby 
prejudiced. Their rights will not ·and cannot he defeated. 
If the Court is of the opinion that the Casualty Com puny 
is liable to plaintiffs on its bond, and was not p~rejudiced 
by Caps-on-Bowman's bre·ach of contract, then tth~e judg-
ment of the trial court must be affirmed. If, on the 
other hand, the Court is of the opd.nion that the plain-
tiffs have no right of action against .the Casualty Com-
pany on its· bond, the judgment should he re~ersed with 
directions to the trial Court to enter judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs against the defendant, Cap~son-Bowman. 
And, if the Court should find that the Casualty Company 
was liable to the plaintiffs on its bond, and should fur-
ther find that the Casua~ty Company was prejudiced by 
Capson-Bowman's breach of contraci, then the Casualty 
Company should have judgment against Capson-Bowman 
in an amount equal to the extent of the damage suffered 
by it, by reason of Cap~son-Bowman 's brea:ch of con-
tract In any view which the Court may tak~e of the 
case, the plaintiffs will be entitled tto and will have a 
judgment against a financially resp~onsible party, and 
neither the letter nor the s:pd.rit of any statute designed 
for the protection of laborers and materialmen will he 
defeated. 
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POINT I. 
THE BOND EXECUTED BY APPELLANT, 
AS SURETY, RAN O·NLY TO DEFENDANT 
CAPSON-BOW.MAN, INC. AS OBLIGEE, AND 
WAS CONDITIONED 0 N.L Y FOR 'THE 
FAITHFUL PERFO·RMANCE OF THE CON-
STRUCTION CONTRACT. THE BOND WAS 
NOT INTENDED FOR THE PRO·TEC·TION OF 
LABORERS AND MATERIAL·MEN; THEY 
ARE . NOT NAMED AS. OBLIGEES; AND 
THEY HAVE NO· RIGHTS UNDER IT. 
(Assignments of error numbered 1 to 13 inclusive, 
I 
and 21 to 31 inclusive are involved in the discussion of 
this point.)· 
It is the position of the appellant, consistently main-
tained throughout the course of this proceeding, that 
the bond e~ecuted by it as surety is conditioned only for 
the proper completion of the building hy the contractor; 
that Capson-Bowma:ri, Inc. is the sole obligee of the 
bond, and is p~rotected only to the extent that the con-
trac;tor should properly complete the construction work; 
that it was never intended by the :parties to the bond 
that laborers and materialmen should fall within the 
protection of its terms or that 1they shonld have any 
rights thereunder; and that such is unambiguously mani-
fest by the plain teTms and conditions of the instrument. 
The bond does not fully satisfy the requirements of Sec-
tion 17-2-1, U.C.A., 1943, and to the extent that it fails 
to answer the requirements of that statute, th~e owner 
(Capson-Bowman) is liable. 
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Section 17-2-1, U. C.A.,' 19±3 proVides as follows : 
'' 17-2-1. Bond to Protect Mechanics and 
~Iateriaimen. 
''The owner of lilly interest in land entering 
into a contract involving $500 or more, for the 
construction, addition to, or alteration or re:pair 
·of, any building, structure or improvement upon 
land shall, before any such work is commeneed, 
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal 
to the contract p·rice, ·with good and sufficient 
sureties, conditi.Joned for the faithful performance 
of the ·contract and prompt payment for material 
furnished and labor performed unde.r the oontract. 
Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other 
persons as their irnt·e1iest may 1app~ea.r; and any 
person who has furnished materials or. performed 
labor for or upon any such building, structure or 
improvement, payment for which has not been 
made, shall have a direct right of action against 
the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable 
value of the materials furnished or labor per-
formed, not exceeding, however, in any case, the 
prices agreed upon; which right of action shall 
accrue forty days after the completion, or aband-
onment, or default in the performance, of the 
work provided for in the contract. 
''The bond herein provided shall he .exhibited 
to any person interested, upon request." (Italics 
added) 
S~ection 1'7 -2-2 provides as follows: 
'' 17-2-2. Failure to Require Bond-Direct 
Liability. 
''Any person ·subject to fu,e p~rovisions of this 
chapter, who shall pail t:o obitlaim such goo1d and 
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sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein 
required, shall be personally liable t:o all persons 
who have furnished) maler~als 1or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor performed, not 
exceeding, however, in any ease the prices agreed 
upon." (Italics added) 
The statutes requiring contractor's bonds are unique, 
and different from the statute-s of most other states 
dealing with the same subject matter. The statutes of 
most states ·are mandatory in their requirement of a con-
tractor's bond. Sometim.es a criminal penalty is at-
tachBd for failure ito comply. However, the Utah statute, 
in effect, provides alternative courses. The owner may 
follow either of three alternative p·rocedures: 
(1) 'The owner may insist. on full financial pro-
tection for himself by requiring a bond conditioned both 
for !the faithful perf'Ormance· of the contract (Jffl)d for 
''prompt paym·ent for material furnished and labor per-
formed under the contract.'' 
(2) The ovvner ma.y a.ssum.e the entire financial 
risk hims-elf by not requiring any bond whatsoever. 
( 3) The owner may protect himself agains.t loss 
due to failure of the contractor to fully complete the 
cons,truction work in accordance with the· terms of the 
contract, by requiring a faithful performance bond. At 
the same time he may assume the risk of unpaid claims 
for labor and material, by his failure to exact from the 
contractor a bond conditioned for the satisfaction of 
such claims. That is exactly what is con:templated by 
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Section 17-2-2. And it is the· contentinn of the app~ellant 
that that is exactly what occurred in this case. 
The thought above expressed was well staJted b~ 
Mr. Justice Thurman sp,eaking for the Court in R'io 
Grande Lumber ,C,omlp(Jm.Y v. Da)rke, 50 Utah, 114, lH7 
Pac. 241, L.R.A. l918A, 1190: 
''If the owner requires the contractor to p;ro-
cure the statutory bond, he is proteeted against 
loss. If he ·does not, he becomes liable to laborers 
and materialmen if the contractor fails to p1ay 
them, even though he may have paid the con-
tractor in full. He has hi.s remedy im his own 
harnds. '' (Italics added) 
See also 57 C.J.S. 5840, M echarnics' !Aens, Sec. 2·57 a: 
"A building contractor and his surety have a 
lega:l right to make any bond, acceptab1e to the 
owner, which they see fit to make.'' 
From the ~earliest days of statehood right down to 
the pres-ent, this Court has refused to extend by im-
plication the liability 'Of a surety on a contractor's bond, 
and unless the bond is conditioned for the payment of 
laborers and materialmen, such p~ersons have no rights 
against the sur;ety. 
The earliest Utah case treating this question was 
Montg'omery v. Spencer, frequentJly cited as Montgomery 
v. Rief, 15 Ut 495, 50 Pac. 623. In that case the assignee 
of a materialman sued the contractor and the sureties 
on his faithful pe-rformance bond. 'The plaintiff had 
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judgment against all defendants in the trial Court, and 
the sureties appealed. The judgm·ent, as against the 
sureties, was revers.ed, with this language: 
''We have no disposition to extend the doe-
trine relating to third parties to new and doubt-
ful cases, and are of the opinion that the bond of 
the appellants created no liability in favor of 
the respondent (plaintiff)~ that the complaint 
stated no cause of action, and that the demurrer 
to it ought to have been sustained.'' 
We quote also, the following pertinent statement 
from the opinion of the Court: 
"To entitle a third party, who may be bene-
fited by the performanee of a contract, to sue, 
there must have been an intention on the part of 
the contracting ll'arties to secure some direct bene-
fit to him, or there must be some privity and some 
obligation or duty from the promisor to the third 
party which will enable him to enforce the con-
tract, or some equitable claim to the benefit re-
sulting from the promise or performance of the 
contract, and there must be some legal right on 
the part of the third party to adopt and claim the 
promise of the contract .... * * * '' 
''The promisors, Spencer and Dee [Sure-
ties], made no promise to pay for material and 
labor used by Rief in the performance of his con-
tract; and owed no duties to the third P'arties.'' 
* * * * ' 
"'They [Sureties] were liable only to the ter-
ritory [obligee named in the bond], for the faith-
ful performance of the contract of Rief, to the ex-
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tent of the penalty provided in the bond, and can-
not be held liable beyond the terms of their con-
tract. Nor can a new and undefined liability be 
established by implication in behalf of a mere 
stranger to the contract, "\Yho thereby might he-
come incidentally benefited. ' ' 
In Smith v. Bowmarn, 32 Ut. 33, 88 Pac. 687, 9 L. R. 
A. (N.S.) 889, it was h·eld that an unpaid materi~lman 
had no right of action against ithe surety on a contrac-
tor's bond where the bond was conditioned that the-
building was free of all liens or right of liens for debts 
due from the contractor, and the building was a public 
building and therefor·e not subject to· liens. The Court 
held .that the "liability [of sureties] is not to be· extended 
by impiicati'On beyond the terms of their contract. They 
are bownd by rthei,r ~agreement and nothing ~el.se; arnd 
they have a right to stand upow the strict term.s of their 
obligations.'' (Italics added) 
And in Blyth-Fa.rgo Co. v. Free, 46 Ut. 233, 148 Pac. 
427, it was held that "although the- third person for 
whose benefit ·a contract was made may maintain an 
action thereon, nevertheless it must appear from the 
provisions of such contract itself, that it was made for 
the benefit ·of the plaintiff, either as an individual or as 
a member of a contemplated class.'' Syllabus 5, Pacific 
Reporter. 
We quotH some pertinent observations of the Court: 
''We must arrive at the intention of the par-
ties fron1 the bond as written .... '' 
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"* * * the surety may define and limit the 
scope of his obligation, and if he has done so in 
apt terms the Court cannot legally enlarge them.'' 
''·* * * it must ap·pear from the terms of the 
contract, or, as in this case, from the bond, that 
its p~rovisions were intended direetly for the bene-
fit of the person who is bringing the action, or 
that he belongs to a elass which was intended to 
be directly benefited.'' 
The same thoughts were expressed in the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice :s:traup: 
''As to sureties, their liability is not to be 
extended by implication beyond the terms of their 
·contract. They have the right to stand strictly on 
the express terms of it and to insist that they 
be not held responsible for any 'liability or obli-
gation not directly expressed within it.'' 
In Paxton v. Sp-enoer, 71 Ut. 313, 265 Pac. 751, the 
court said: 
''The liability of the surety must he deter-
mined and measured by the terms of the bond.'' 
The m'Ost recent expression of the Court on the 
question which our research has discoveried, is that con-
tained in the opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in C oriplo.ratvon 
of the President of ,Ch!u.r:ch of Jesus C'hrist of Latter-rJay 
Slaints v. Hartford Acdt. & Inaem. ·Co. et al., 98 Ut. :2~97, 
95 Pac. (2d) 736. 
It was there said that ''the liab[lity of the Surety is 
based on the bond and only those parties made bene-
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ficiaries by the bond can have an action thereon.'' The 
Court cited the Utah cas-es which have heretofore been 
discussed, and also the following cases from oth·er juris-
dictions which are to the same effect: 
Ger. Alliance & Ins. Co. v. Home VViater Swpvp·ly Co., 
226 U. S. 220, 33 S. Ct.- 32, 57 L. 1Ed. 195, 42 L. R. A_. 
(N.S.) 1000. 
B. F. Sturtevan.t Co. v. FideTJity & D~ep,osit Co., 2nd 
Cir., 285 F. 367. 
Ratl. BOfnk v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. C1o., 95 'Tex. 176, 
66 s.w. 203. 
Fidelity & Dep,osit Co. v. R~ainer, 2·20 Ala. 2.62·, 125 
So. 55, 77 A.L.R. 13. 
Pamkey v. Natl. Suretvy ·Co., 115 Or. 658, 239 Pac. 
808. 
In view of the Utah cases above discussed, it hardly 
seems necessary to look to the decisions of other Courts 
for assistance on this question. Howev.er, if further 
authority may be helpful, we invite the Court's atten-
tion to the following: 
9 Am. Jur. 62, Building and Construction Contracts, 
Sec. 96: 
'' [W] here the bond is designed solely for 
the benefit of the formal parties thereto, laborers 
and materialmen cannot sue thereon even though 
they might derive some incidental, consequential 
or remote benefit from its enforcement.'' 
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Fleck-AtZ(JJYbtic C.o. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N . .A.., 
326 Pa. 15, 191 A. 51 : 
In this case defendant had .e~ecuted as sur·ety a 
performance bond for a sub-contractor. The prime con-
tractor was named as obligee. By express provisions of 
the bond, the terms of the sub-contract were made a part 
of the bond. One of the sub-contractor's unpaid ma-
terialmen sued the defendant surety on the bond. The 
Court held that the plaintiff had no right of recov,ery 
against the surety, saying: 
''A bond given pursuant to a contract in-
corporated in the bond will he eonstrued in the 
light of the terms of the -contract and the at-
tendant circumstances, but the obligation of the 
bond eannot be extended beyond the plain import 
of the words used.' Lancaster v. Frescoln, 192 
Pa. 452, 457, 43 A. 961, 962; Erie v. Dief!endorf, 
278 Pa. 31, 122 A. 157. '' * * * 
"If 1t:h.e parties had intended to i,nclJude ma.. 
t.erialn~en as parties to be benefiited, ~a few .ad-
ditional words would have expressed the ag.ree-
ment. * * * the Cou.rt may not make a new con-
t·ract for the p1arties." (Italics added) 
Adirondack Core & Plug Co. v. N.Y.C.R. Co. et ·al., 
238 App·. Div. 346, 264 N.Y.S. 484. (Affirmed without 
op1nion, 264 N.Y. 439, 191 N.E. 503). 
C.rane ·Co. v. Barwick T·renching Corp~., 138 Cal. App. 
319, 32 Pac. (2d) 387. 
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Anno. in 12 A. L. R. 382, 387 : 
''The bond of a com·pensated surety is not 
to be so construed as to extend his liability be-
yond the terms of the contract which he has 
made.'' 
The above rule is reaffirmed in the later 
annotation in 94 A.L.R. 876, 881. 
Ky. Rock Asphalt C·o. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of 
N.Y., 6th Cir., 37 Fed. ( 2d) 279. 
57 C.J.S. 41, Mechanics' Lhens, Sec. 257d. 
''In order to render available to the o'vner 
the exemptions from, or limitations of, liability 
resulting from the taking of a contractor's statu-
tory bond, the bond must b.e oorndit~oned as p>ro-
vided by statute." (Italics added.) 
And at p. 846, Sec. 259a: 
''Where it is sought to recover from the 
sureties on a building contractor's bond for claims 
or liens, or damage or loss resulting therefrom, 
their liability cannot he extended beyond the 
terms of their contract * * *." 
Am. Sash & D.oor Co. v. McGregor, (Okla.), 264 P. 
602. 
The holding of the cas-e is accurately reflected by 
syllabus 2: Where officers of a municipality fail to re-
quire a bond of a contractor conditione:d as requir~ed hy 
statute, hut do require a bond conditioned that the con-
tractor shall f·aithfully pe·rform said contract on his part 
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according to the terms, eovenants, and conditions there-
of, and the public improvement is eomp~leted by the con-
tractor ·to the satisfaction of the municipality, there is 
no breach in conditions of said bond, and the surety is 
not liable to a materialman for material furnished the 
contractor in -completing the work. The terms. and con-
ditions of such bond cannot be extended by implication. 
Said the Court: 
"But in the absence of a bond so conditioned, 
under the authorities above eited the Court can-
not make a new contract or write into a contract, 
which is plain and unambiguous, -conditions which 
would impose obligations upon the surety beyond 
and in excess of the liability; assumed by it. * * * 
'The plaintiff was in business ·for profit, and to 
that extent was on no different footing than the 
bond company. If the plaintiff was not furnish-
ing material to the -contractor solely upon his 
financial responsibility, an inspection of the bond 
as given would have disclosed that it was not the 
statutory bond for the benefit of 'laborers and to 
materialmen. While it was the duty of the school 
board to have required the statutory bond, it was 
also within the option of the defendant Casualty 
Company to refuse to sign such a bond, and hav-
ing signed a bond the conditions of which are not 
shown hy the pleadings herein to have been 
breached, and the conditions of which did not 
go to the extent of paying for material furnished, 
the Court cannot make a contract and create a 
liability which would save the plaintiff a loss 
which it may possibly sustain by reason of its in-
advertence in not knowing the character of the 
bond given if, in fact, it extended credit expect-
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ing to resort to such bond in the event of non-
payment.'' 
U. S. use of StaUings v. Starr, 4th Cir., 20 F. (2d) 
803: 
''Under the lavv of North Carolina, the mere 
requirement of the statute· that a bond contain 
an obligation does not of itself incorporate the 
obligation in the bond. * * * A statutory p·ro-
vision that a bond given under the statute shall 
protect the claims of laborers and materialmen, 
whether such provision he incorporated in the 
bond or not, will he given effeet. * * * But, in 
the absence of some such statutory p·rovision, the 
Courts will not read into a bond an obligation 
which it does not contain.'' 
Scharbauer v. Lampasses County, (Tex. Civ. App·.), 
214 S. W. 468. 
O·cala use of Svanda·rd Oil C.o. v. Continenta.l·C:asual-
ty Co., 99 Fla. 736, 127 So. 326: 
"[T]here was no duty or obligation of the 
surety company to enter into the bond that the 
statute requires the -contractor to execute, before 
commencing the public work. * * * The bond 
of the surety company in this case does not, by its 
terms or by reference or otherwise, indicate that 
it was given pursuant to, or for the p·urposes de-
signed by, the statute; and as the statute does not 
expressly or impliedly forbid giving of such a 
bond as was executed, and does not expressly or 
hy intendment make the statu·tory provisions ap-
ply notwithstanding the terms of the bond, the 
liability of the surety company dep.ends upon the 
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terms of its bond, which do not cover liability for 
labor, material, and supplies used by contractors 
in the street improvement provided for in the con-
tract with the City.'' 
C:ooper v. Hardin & Co., (T·ex. Civ. App.), 219 S. 
w. 550: 
''We are not permitted to read into this bond 
terms and conditions favorable to the plaintiff 
and others. If the p~laintiffs had been diligent, they 
could have discovered what kind of a bond had 
been given, and whether such bond protected the 
materialmen.'' 
Acme B·rick Cio. v. Tai!Jlor, (Tex. Civ. App.), 223 
s. w. 248. 
Teriry v. Soulhwes1tern Bldg. Co., (Cal. App.), 185 
Pac. 212. 
We have not attempted here to cite all of the author-
ities in our favor. W·e are awar~e of other authorities to 
the same eff·ect, and we are confident that many more 
could be produced. We are also aware that ther~e are 
many cases holding to the contrary, and we are confident 
that such cases will he cit,ed to the C'Ourt by respondents. 
No attempt has been made by us to exhaust the field. 
The eas·es treating the question of the liability of a 
surety on a -contractor's bond to unpaid laborers and 
materialmen are legion. Thfany views have been expres-
sed. The cases in many instances turn upon the exist-
ence or non-existence of controlling statutes; the lan-
guage of the bond; the terms of the contract; and other 
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ment of the entire question which we have discovered is 
that contained in the Annotation in 77 A. L. R. com-
mencing at page 21 and continuing for approximately 
200pages. 
At page 77 of fu.e Annotation it is said: 
''The Courts seem to be generally agreed 
that a laborer or materialman cannot recover on 
a contractor's bond to the owner, unless the 
parties to the instrument contemplated some bene-
fit to such third parties ; and the trend of the 
decisions is to make the rights of laborers and 
materia1men dependent up·on an intention ·of the 
parties to pro teet them.'' 
The author of the Annotation, R. I. Kimbrough, con-
cludes the treatise with a resume and conclusion com-
mencing at page 212. At page 213 he says: 
''According to the prevailing rule, the right 
of laborers and materialmen to recover on a con-
tractor's bond depends upon the terms of the in-
strument. * * * It depends upon whether the bond 
is actually for the benefit of such p~ersons, or is 
for the protection of the nominal obligee and 
merely incidentally benefits the third parties. * * * 
''Where the bond is conditioned merely to 
indemnify and hold harmless the owner or p·uhlic 
body, it seems, both by authority and reason, that 
it does not inure to the benefit of laborers and 
materialmen so as to enable them to recover 
thereon. * * * While the p·erformance of this 
condition may incidentally benefit such third 
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parties, it does not necessarily do so. As pointed 
out hy P'rofessor Corbin in 38 Yale L. J. 1, 14, 
even if they have a right to a lien on the obligee's 
personal property, they may not perfect it, or 
their liens may he discharged in some other way 
than hy paying their claims. And svuch a corndition 
ce.rtlainly does wot ~amovwnt to ~an undertakim..g to 
pay such pers1ons." (Italics added.) 
The Annotation in 77 A. L. R. is sup~plemented by 
a later one in 118 A. L. R., commencing at prage 57, to 
which we also invite the Court's attention. 
On the basis of s1-tlare ·decisi:s alone, 'the decision of 
the trial Court should be reversed. This Court has re-
p~eatedly refused to extend to laborers and materialmen 
the protection of a contractor's bond conditioned only for 
faithful performance, and not for the benefit of laborers 
and materialmen. For many years now property owners, 
building contractors, an9. surety companies have con-
tract:ed in the light of those decisions. If they ar:e now 
to be overturned, and the principles therein asserted re-
nounced, who can say how many sureties will suddenly 
find their liahili ty on exe-cuted bonds .extended far be-
yond their intent, and far beyond what they have been 
paid to assume; and at the same time many land-owners 
may suddenly find the.ms~elves protected to a point. far 
in excess of what they expected or requested or paid for. 
If the rule heretofore laid down by the Court is to he 
changed, such change ought to be effected by legislative, 
not judicial action, so that all parties concerned with con-
struction bonds may contract in the light of lmown rules. 
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The rule heretofore laid down by this Court is a 
good rule. There is no reason 'vhy surety companies 
should be saddled with financial obligations, when they 
were not paid to assum·e the risks. While it is tru·e that 
the Casualty Company here is in the business of acting 
as surety on bonds, and is paid therefore, it is likewise 
true that Capson-Bowman, Inc. is -engaged in th·e real 
estate business for profit, and Martin was engaged in 
the construction business for profit. All of ihe parties 
to this action were engaged in business. .They dealt at 
arms length. Caps-on-Bowman could have insisted that 
Martin procure a bond conditioned for the payment of 
laborers and materialmen. It did not do so. The various 
plaintiffs were ~entitled to examine the bond. They could 
have determined the extent of the bonding protection 
which the owner had purchased. 
There is nothing in the languag,e of the bond to even 
hint that laborers and materiahnen should fall within 
its protection. It is called a '' p~erformanee bond'' and 
by way of further explanation the word ''construction'' 
is contained in parentheses imrnediately under the title. 
of the bond. Capson-Bowman is the sole obligee named, 
and the sole condition is that the principal (Martin) shall 
well and truly perform all the agre·ements of the eon-
tract. 
The plaintiffs are strangers to the terms of the 
bond. To give them a right of action against the surety 
is to write a new contract imposing liabilities far he-
yond those contemplated or intended to be assumed by 
the parties. In justice and in fairness, as well as on 
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logic and precedent, the judgment of the trial Court 
should be reversed. 
POINT II. 
IF THE CO·UR:T SHOUL.D HOLD THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD A RIGHT OF AC-
TION AGAINST DEFENDANT CASUALTY 
COMPANY, THEN 'THE CASUALTY COM-
PANY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT 
AGAINST CAPS:O·N-BOWMAN, INC. TO THE 
EXTENT THAT IT WAS PREJUDICED BY 
CAPSON BO·WMAN'S BREACH OF ITS CON-
TRACT WITH MARTIN. 
(Assignments of error numbered 14 to 21 
inclusive, 30 and 31 are involved in the discussion 
of this· point). 
We have already argued at some length that the 
Casualty Company was not liable in its bond to the plain-
tiffs. We hope that in advancing our second point we 
will not be understood as eonfessing weakness under 
Point I. W.e a.re firmly of the opinion that the position 
maintained by us under P:oint I is correct, and if the 
Court rules as we contend that it should, it will be un-
necessary to consider Point II. However, we feel that 
we would be derelict in our duty both ·to the Court and 
to our client, if we did not advance the argument pre-
sented under Point II. And if we do not prevail under 
Point I, then we are entitled to prevail under Point II. 
Under the terms of ~the contract between Capson-
Bowman and Martin, Capson-B·o~an was required to 
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withhold 10% of the eontract price until lVIartin had 
satisfactorily completed the work. No payments were 
to be made until M·artin produced satisfactory lien-
waivers from the laborers and materialmen. It is un-
disputed that both of these provisions were violated by 
Capson-Bowman. 
Appellant has -consistently maintained and now 
maintains that the failure of Capson-Bowman to comp~ly 
with the provisions of this contract was prejudicial to it, 
and if plaintiffs have a right of action against appellant, 
then appellant is entitled to a right of action over as 
against Capson-Bowman, and is entitled to a judgment 
against it, at least in the amount that appellant was 
prejudiced by Capson-Bowman 's breach of contract. 
It was ap,parently the view of the trial Court that 
I 
the plaintiff had the burden of showing the existence 
and extent of any prejudice suffered by it as a result of 
Capson-Bowman's breach, and that since no oral ~testi­
mony was taken, appellant failed to sustain its burden of 
proof on the Cross-Complaint. It is our position that 
the stipulation of counsel as to the paym.ents made by 
Capson-Bowman, together with the documents which 
comprise exhibit 5, is sufficient not only to authorize 
but to comp~el a finding of prejudice to a~ppellant. 
The payments made by Capson-Bowman are shown 
by the Stipulation (R. 348-349) and are set forth in the 
statement of facts. 
The third payment made .by Cap~son-Bowman to 
l\fartin was on May 11, 1946, was in the sum of $2, 722.31, 
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as evidenced by check No. 3089, contained in Exhibit 5. 
No lien waive·rs whatsoever were furnished to ·Capson-
Bowman for payment of this claim. All that was fur-
nished were two receipts by Martin acknowledging pay-
ment of $2,076.60 and $695.71 by Capson-Bowman and 
agre·eing with Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Company 
that any liens on Caps-on-Bowman's property should be 
inferior to a mortgage on said p~roperty held by said 
hank. C.ertainly this was no p·rotection either to Capson-
Bowman or to appellant. It was merely an agr~e,ement 
between two persons holding se:eurity interests in Cap-
son-Bowman's property as to the priority of such in-
terests. 
'The fourth payment of $2,474.50 was made on July 
8, 1946, as evidenced by check No. 3406 and was wholly 
unsupported by lien waive-rs of any kind. 
The payment made on August 1'7, 1946, in the sum 
of $2,977.00 as evidenced by check No. 3646 was sup-
ported by lien waivers in the total sum of only $1,436.91, 
so that there was a payment unsupported by lien waivers, 
in the sum of $1,540.09. 
Two payments made on November 7, 1946, in the 
total sum of $1,200.00 evidenced by checks numbered 4108 
and 4109 we-r·e wholly unsupported by lien waivers of any 
kind. 
On the payment of $3,063.17 made November 22, 
1946, as evidenced hy check No. 416·5, lien waivers by E. 
K. Fuller in the amount of $264.75; Dean Amundsen in 
the amoun~t of $17.25 and D. D. Jordan in the amount of 
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$13.36 were never signed. Hence $295.36 of this p~ay­
ment was unsupported by lien waivers. 
The final ~payments of $386.70; $150.00; and $390.45, 
made on January 17, 1947, as evidenced by checks num-
bered 4801, 4802 and 4803, were all unsupported by lien 
waivers of any kind. 
The final ·contract p-rice, after additions and ·de-
ductions was $32,406.00. Cap·son-Bowman was bound to 
withhold 10% or $3,240.60 until after satisfactory com-
pletion of the contract. T·he amount actually withheld by 
Capson-Bowman, (and later paid into Court) was $2,-
188.31. "Thus there was an additional unauthorized pay-
ment of $1,052.29. 
The total amount of unauthorized payments is $10,-
211.70 which is more than the amount of the judgment 
agains·t appellant. That the surety -company was preju-
diced by such impro~per payments is easily demonstrated. 
It requires but little imagination to see that the failur:e 
to withhold 10% -of the contract priee was p·r.ejudicial 
to the Casualty Company. If ·the full10% had been with-
held there would have been an additional $1052.29 in the 
"kitty'' which was paid into Court, and there would 
therefore, hav-e been that much more for plaintiffs and 
that much less that the Ca:sual·ty Company would have 
been liable to pay. 
The only fair conclusion that can he drawn from 
the failure to require lien waivers is th'at the Casualty 
Company was thereby prejudiced. It seems certain that 
if Capson-Bowman had insisted on lien waivers before 
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payment of advances to the Contractor, that either pay-
ments would have been made to the plaintiffs by the 
contractor, or ·that enough money would have been with-
held by Capson-Bowman to satisfy such claims. 
It is the general rule that a material departure by 
the owner, without the consent of the surety, from the 
express requir1ements of a construction contract with 
regard to time, method, manner or amounts of payments 
made to the -contractor, opera:tes to rele·ase or discharge 
from liability to the own·er the surety on the Contractor's 
bond, at least to the eX'tent that such unauthorized pay-
ments result in injury or prejudice to the surety. Pro-
visions in -construction contracts requiring the owner to 
retain certain percentages of the contract price, are not 
only for the protection of the owner, but also for the 
benefit of the surety on the contractor's bond. See 
127 A. L. R. 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, · 22 and ·23. 
The rule is stated thus by Willis'ton: 
''The obvious :prejudice to a surety from the 
surrender by the creditor of security held by 
him has established the rule that such a sur-
render discharges the surety to the extent of the 
value of the security surrendered''. 4 Wil•liston 
on Contracts 3529, Sec. 1232. See also Sec. 1243, 
pp. 3559-3561. 
See to the same effect Ste,a.rns, Law .of Suretyship, 
p·p. 107 e, 108, Sec. 76h. 
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The rules above stated have been followed in this 
jurisdiction. In Raxtorn v. Spencer, 71 Ut. 313, 265 P. 751, 
the Court said : 
''Conditions or provisions requiring the re-
tention of 10 per cent. of a contract until the 
completion of the work are, under all of the auth-
orities, binding upon the parties to the contract. 
Such provisions are clearly made for the benefit 
of the surety as well as for the contractors and, as 
stated by some courts, are an incentive to make 
the contractor complete the work according to 
the terms of the agreement. * * * ' ' 
The Court went on to hold that the release of the 
surety should be limited to the pro tanto amount of the 
damage sustained by him by reason of the owner's 
breach. Appellant, of course, contends that the breach 
in this case damaged it to the full e~tent of its liability 
to the plaintiffs. 
The doctrine of Paxton v. SpBncer was reaffirmed 
in Latter-day S,fiAifnts Church v. Hartford Acdt. & Indeni. 
Co., 98 Ut. 297, 95 Pac. (2d) 736. The Court in that 
case also recognized that a breach hy ~the owner might, 
in some cases op~erate as a full release of ~the surety. 
Speaking through Mr. Justice Wolf,e the Court said : 
''There may he some breaches that would 
work a full release of the surety .... " 
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In view of the foregoing authorities, the appellant 
is entitled, as a matter of law, to a judgment against Cap-
son-Bowman to the extent of any riability of appellant to 
any of the plaintiffs in this cas~e. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against ap-
pellant should be reversed. 'The bond on which appellant 
was surety was strictly a performance bond. The sole 
oblige·e on the bond was the owner, Capson-Bowman. 
The sole condition was completion of the building in ac-
eordance with the specifications of the contract. The 
condition was never hre'ached. The bond not being con-
ditioned for the payment of laborers and materialmen; 
and they not being obligees on the bond; and there being 
no breach of any conditions of the bond, the plaintiffs 
have no right of action against appellant, and the judg-
ment in their favor and against appellant should be re-
versed. 
If the judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against 
appellant is permitted to stand, then the Court should 
O-rder that judgment be entered in favor of appellant on 
its Cross-Com:plaint againS't Capson-Bowman, Inc., for 
the reason that appe11ant was prejudiced by reason of 
Capson-Bowman's breach of its contract with l\1a:rtin. 
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In any vie'v of the case, both on reason and logic, 
·eqmty and fairness, and judicial p·r·ecedent, ap~p~ellant is 
entitled to be exonerated from liability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR E. MORETON, 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Ap'Pellxunt 
Genef"!al C~aswalty C·o~pany of Amerioa, 
a corporation. 
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